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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION
STATE OF GEORGIA

GEORGIA ENVIRONMENTAL FINANCE
AUTHORITY,

Plaintiff,
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO.
2018CV308768

CH2M HILL ENGINEERS, INC.,
LAYNE CHRISTENSEN COMPANY,
TRAVELERS CASUALTY AND SURETY
COMPANYOF AMERICAand LIBERTY
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants.

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This construction dispute concerns thefailed effort to construct a deep, fresh
waterwell in
Tybee Island, Georgia (the “project”). The parties include the project’s owner,
Plaintiff Georgia
Environmental Finance Authority (“GEFA”), the project’s designer and
construction site
supervisor, Defendant CH2M Hill Engineers, Inc. (“CH2M”), and its
builder, Defendant Layne

Christensen Company(“Layne”).
This matter comes before the Court on four different motions for summary judgmen
t: (1)
GEFA’S Motion for Summary Partial Summary Judgment against CH2M, (2)
CH2M’s Motion
for Summary Judgment against GEFA, (3) GEFA’s MotionforPartial Summary
Judgmentagainst
Layne, and (4) CH2M’s Motion for Summary Judgmentagainst Layne’s Cross Claims.!

Having

' There are fourdifferent Rule 6.5 Statements to supportthe fourdifferent motions
for summary judgment, and they
will be cited as follows:

reviewed the record and considered the arguments of counsel during
a hearing on December 13,
2021, the Court enters the following order.

I.

FINDINGS OF FACT
A. GEFA’s Preliminary Plans to Construct a Deep Water Well in Coastal
Georgia.

GEFAisa state-run instrumentality whose mission is to help local
Georgia communities
“provide neededfacilities that both protect the environment and
provide for ... future economic
expansion.” O.C.G.A. § 50-23-2. Coastal Georgia relies heavily onthe
Floridian Aquifer forits
drinking water.” Concerns aboutthe continued viability of this water
source led GEFA to begin
looking foralternative methods to supply water to Georgia’s coastal
region? Hilton Head, South
Carolina had successfully created a deep water well utilizing the Cretac
eous Aquifer, whichis
found far below the land’s surface.4 GEFA commissioned this project
to explore the viability of
using the Cretaceous Aquifer for drinking water on the Georgia coast,
deciding to drill the well on
Tybee Island.* Should the well provea feasible source of drinking
water, GEFA intended that the
City of Tybee Island would have the option to “develop whateveraddi
tional water treatment and
infrastructure may be necessary to use the well for water supply ..
.”6
B.

_GEFA Enters into Contracts Governing the Project.

(1) Satement supporting GEFA’S Motion for Summary Partial Summar
y Judgment against CH2M

(“GEFA SUMF”);

(2) Statement supporting CH2M’s Motionfor Summary Judgmen
t against GEFA (““CH2M SUMF”);
(3) Statement supporting GEFA’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgmen
t against Layne (“GEFA-Layne
SUMF”), and the

(4) Statement supporting CH2M’s Motion for Summary Judgment
against Layne’s Cross Claims

(“CH2M-Layne SUMF”).
> CH2M SUMF 43, GEFA’s Resp. to SUMF 4 3.
> Id. at 994, 5.
* GEFA’s Resp. to CH2M SUMF 16.

° CH2M SUMF 9 61 GEFA’s Resp. to CH2M SUMF 4 6; CH2M-L
ayne SUMF § 4; Layne Resp. to CH2M-Layne

SUMF 4 4.
° CH2M SUMF 99, Ex. D (Apr. 15, 2015 letter, p. 1); GEFA Resp. to
CH2M SUMF 19.
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The Design Contract. On May27, 2014, GEFA contracted
with CH2M to design the well

and then oversee its construction and testing (the “Design Contra
ct”).’ Various sections of the
Design Contract require the GEFA’s approval of CH2M’s desig
n work.8
The Technical Specifications, the Bidding Documents, and the Constr
uction Contract. In
accordance with its contractual responsibilities, CH2M designed the
well and preparedtechnical
specifications forits construction (the “Technical Specifications”).?
In summarizing the work to
be performed, the Technical Specifications describe the projec
t as the construction of a
“production” well andalso as a “test” well.!? These Technical
Specifications prepared by CH2M
were incorporated into documents that would govern of the
project’s construction (the
“Construction Documents”) as well as documents that would be
used tosolicit bids from well-

drilling contractors (the “Bidding Documents”). !!
Layne, a nationally recognized well drilling company, wasthe succes
sful bidder, and, on
September29, 2015, it entered into a contract with GEFA
to construct the well (the “Construction
Contract”).'* Thetitle page and prefatory comments to
the Construction Contract refer to the

project as a production well. Section 1.1.9.17 of the Construction
Contract defined the “Contract
Documents” to include, “the executed [Construction] Contra
ct, the Bidding Documents, the Bid,
the General Requirements whichinclude all incorporated forms,
the Construction Documents, and

all Change Orders.” This definition was adopted in § 1.1.6.1 of the
Design Contract.

7 GEFA SUMF 4 1; CH2MHM Resp. to GEFA SUMF

1.

® Seee.g., DesignContract, §§ 2.1.5.1, 2.1.6.9 and 2.1.7.3.

° GEFA SUMF § 3; CH2M Resp to GEFA SUMF 43.
'° Technical Specifications, § 01 11 00 1.01(A) and (B).
''GEFA SUMF ff 3, 8; CH2M Resp. to GEFA SUMF 43, 8.

". GEFA-Layne SUMF 4 3, Layne Resp. to GEFA-Layne SUMF
{]3; GEFA Brf. in Supp. of MPSJ against Layne,
Ex. B.
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Layne and CH2M hadno direct contractual relationship.'? The Constru
ction Contract
specifically states CH2M is not GEFA’s agent but only acts as GEFA’s consult
ant “in determining
if the conditionsof the contract had been met.”!4 In CH2M’s role as constru
ction supervisor, the
Design Contract had numerousprovisions regarding its obligation to report
and/or seek approval
from GEFA regarding changes inthe project.'* The Construction Contrac
t contained similar
provisionsdirecting how Layne should handle changes in the scope of work.!®
Notably, § 1.1.7.1
required GEFA’s approval for any amendmentto the Contract Documents
and specifically stated
that CH2M “had no authority to amend the Contract Documents, orally
or in writing, either
expressly or by implication.”
CG.

Well DesignIssues and Concerns.

GEFA and CH2M generally agree about the various phases of the well’s
construction.!7
Once those phases were complete, the well was to be cleaned and primedf
or operation followed

by testing that would allow feasibility report to be completed. '8
Of particular import to these motions is C2HM’s design concerning the screen
assembly
whichis inserted into the well’s borehole. A screen assembly includes varyingi
ntervals ofsolid,
pipe-like casing referred to as blank casing interspersed with sections of
screen casing. Generally,
blank casing supports the well’s structure and serves to reduce the amounto
f debris and sediment

'S CH2M-Layne SUMF { 9; Layne Resp. to CH2M-Layne SUMF 4 9.
'\ GEFA-Layne SUMF 4 5; Layne Resp. to GEFA-Layne SUMF 4 5.

' See e.g. Design Contract § 2.2.6.2 (requires CH2M to “report deviatio
n from the Contract Documents” to GEFA);
§ 2.2.9.1 (states CH2M “shall review and submit for approval of GEFA,
Change Orders to the Construction Contract,
as conditions warrant”); § 2.2.9.3 (provides CH2M “shall order no changes
in the Work without the approval of

[GEFA]”).

'6 See e.g. Construction Contract § § 1.1.2.1. (requires “consensus decisio
ns by the Project Team, where differing
from the Contract Documents, be expeditiously resolved and reduced
to writing in an appropriate change order”);
§ 2.2.3.2 (provides that if Layne “believes that any corrections required
by [CH2M]constitute a changeto the
contract, [Layne] shall immediately notify” and request instructions
from both CH2M and GEFA), and § 3.2.3
(expressly forbids “any changes whatsoever in the work” absent a GEFAapproved changeorder and provides
Layne shall have no claim for paymentfor any such work performed).

'7 CH2M SUMP,§ 25; GEFA Resp. to CH2M SUMF 925.
8 Id.

that can infiltrate the well in areas whereit is not drawing water wherea
s permeablescreen casing

is used in areas of the well where water flows so thatit mayenterinto the well.!?
In designing a screen assembly, a key concernis its hang weight which
addresses the ability
of the screen casing to maintain its shape and strength while holding the
weight of blank casing
hanging below it.?° Failure to properly account for the screen assemb
ly’s hang weight could

compromise a well’s functionality.?!
Here, § 33 21 13.06 (3.04(B)) ofthe well’s Technical Specifications states
, “[c]asing which
fails, collapses, or separates during construction shall be removed from
the hole and repaired or
replaced at [Layne’s] sole expense.” Another provision in the Techni
cal Specifications, § 33 21
13.03 (3.04(A)) provides, “. . . if the casing orscreen is broken or collaps
es, then the well will not
be consideredsatisfactory and the well will be abandoned by [Layne]
at[its] own expense.”
The Technical Specifications for the screen assembly prepared by CH2M
establishedthe
blank casing should have a minimum thickness of 0.365 inches.
22

Those same Technical

Specifications estimated the total length of blank and screen casing,
stating the “[f]inal casing
lengths shall be determined by CH2M” afterthe borehole forthe well
had been drilled and more

was knownaboutthe well’s subsurface geological conditions.23
D.

Concernsabout the Design of the Screen Assembly Arise.

At some point, CH2M considered redesigning the screen assembly.
Its anticipated redesign would substantially reduce the amount of screen casing while
increasing the amount of
blank casing, thereby increasing the screen assembly’s hang weight
.In an April 4, 2016 letter
'° C2HM SUMF § 25, n. 1; GEFA Resp. to C2ZHM SUMF § 25.
°° CH2M Resp. in Opp. to GEFA’s MPSJ, Ex. J (Bongioanni Dep., p. 27).

2! CH2M SUMF § 48; GEFA Resp. to CH2M SUMF 4 48; CH2M-Layne
SUMF § 14; Layne Resp. to CH2M-Layne

SUMF § 14.
22 GEFA SUMF { 5; CH2M Resp. to GEFA SUMF 45; see also Technical Specific
ations § 33 21 13.06 2.02(E).
°3 Technical Specifications § 33 21 13.06 3.01(C); CH2M SUMF §[ 46; GEFA
Resp. to CH2M SUMF 446.
*4 CH2M SUMF 4 47; GEFA Resp. to CH2M SUMF § 47.
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to CH2Mdiscussingthe anticipated re-design, Layne sharedits concer
ns about the increased hang

weight.25
On May26, 2016, CH2Missued revised design of the screen
assembly whichcalled for
significantly more blank casing thanit had estimated in the Techni
cal Specifications.2° In order
to address hang weight concerns caused by the change, CH2Md
etermined to reducethe thickness
of the blank casing from 0.365 to 0.25 inches. 2? This change
spurred numerous discussions
between CH2M regarding the hang weight and the suitability
of the thinner blank casing in this
deep well application.?8
On July 8, 2016, CH2M circulated its final screen assembly
design to Layne which
employedthe thinner casing,essentially rejecting Layne’s concer
ns.’ It is undisputed that GEFA
was never presented with a formal change order concerning
the redesigned screen assembly.
Further, GEFA contendsit was never made awareofthe concerns
Layne raised with CH2M about

its revised design.>°
E.

Screen Assemblyis Installed, an Obstruction is Detected and Constr
uction

Ceases.

Layneinstalled the screen assembly in accordance with CH2M’s
revised design.?! On or
aboutJuly 26, 2016, Layne ran a caliper tool downthe well
that could not pass 3,015 feet below

the land’s surface, and Layne advised CH2M anobstruction had
been detected? On or about
August 12, 2016, Layne ran a camera down the well which reveal
ed a problem with a 200-foot

*> Layne Resp. to CH2M-Layne SUMF, Ex. 13.
°° GEFA SUMF §f 14, 17; CH2M Resp. to CH2M SUMF $f 14, 17.
°7 CH2M-Layne SUMF § 16; CH2M Resp. to CH2M SUMF § 16.
°8 GEFA SUMF {| 15; CH2M Resp. to CH2M SUMF, § 15.
*° GEFA SUMF { 18; CH2M Resp. to GEFA SUMF 18.

°° GEFABrf. in Supp. of MPSJ against CH2M, pp. 11-12.
3! GEFA-Layne SUMF {| 24; Layne Resp. to GEFA-Layne SUMF
4 24.

°° GEFA SUMF 4 19-20; CH2M Resp. to GEFA SUMF 4 19-20.
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section ofthe thinner blank casing found approximately 3,015 feet below land surface
? GEFA
describes the problem as a “collapse” while CH2M describesit as a “partial
deformation.’34
Becauseofthe current posture ofthe case, with various motions for summary judgmen
t, the Court
will simply refer to the well’s problem as a collapse/deformation, recogni
zing that the parties
dispute the precise descriptor.
F.

GEFA, CH2M,and Layne Consider How to Proceed.

Construction ceased while the problem andpossible remedies were investigated.*>

Layne’s

crew and equipment remained on site as the parties considered how to proceed
. Immediately
following the collapse/deformation, CH2M and Laynepresented GEFA with
differing ideas about
how to move forward.
On August 24, 2016, Layne informed GEFAthat it was in a “standby mode”
pending a
decision on how to proceed.*° Despite the collapse/deformation, Layne “recommended
developing
andtesting the well... in an effortto try to gathertest data as initially planned.”?”
Layne advised
repair attempts could further damage the well and should be carefully evaluate
d. In an August 26,
2016 response, CH2M, inits role as GEFA’s construction supervisor, rejected
Layne’s position
that it was experiencing any standby time reimbursable underthe terms
of the Construction
Contract."” 38 On September2, 2016, Layne lodged a Notice of Protest contesting CH2M’s
rejection
ofits standby time.*?

3 Id at 421.

* Id. at {] 21-22, 25. Each parties’ expert has used the word “collapse” to describe
the problem. In rendering his
opinion, GEFA’s expert refers to the problemas a collapse. (GEFA Resp. to
CH2M’s MSJ, p. 12-13; Ex. 13, p. 9.)
CH2M’s expertreferred to the problem asa “partial collapse.” (CH2M Resp. to GEFA
MSI, Ex. Y, p. 3.) The report
of Layne’s expertis titled “Opinion on the Collapse of the GEGA TybeeIsland Cretaceous
Aquifer Production Well”
and throughout the body ofthe report, he repeatedly refers to the problem asa collapse.
(Id. at Ex. Z).

3 Id. at | 25.

36 GEFA-Layne SUMF 33; Layne Resp. to GEFA-Layne SUMF 4.33; GEFA
MPS] against CH2M, Ex. N.
71d.

*8 GEFA SUMF 4 27; CH2M Resp. § 27; GEFA MPSJ against CH2M, Ex. Q.
* GEFA SUMF § 28; CH2M Resp. § 28.

On September 12, 2016, CH2M sent Layne a formal Notice of Non-Co
mpliant Work,
advising Layne thatthe as-built well did not comply with the Construction
Documentsbecause of

the “deformation . . . of the casing.”4° On October 17, 2016, CH2M sent Layne
and Up-Dated
Notice

of Non-Compliant

work that provided

more

detailed

information

about the

collapse/deformation.* ' Pursuant to those provisions of the Technical Specifications obligat
ing
Layneto resolve casing defects, the notice provided Laynewith two weekseither

to begin repairing

or replacing the casing orto notify GEFA that such repair or replacement
wasnot possible so that
arrangements could commence for the construction of a new well.42
The casing wasnot repaired or replaced, and no new well was constructed.
Because ofthe
collapse/deformation, GEFA ultimately determined that well would
not be suitable to serve as a
municipal water source for Tybee Island and declined to complete the well,
so no feasibility testing

occurred.*? Thislitigation ensued.
II. PROCEDURAL POSTURE
GEFAfiled the above-styled complaint on August 7, 2018. On November
19, 2019, that
complaint was amended and nowincludes claims for: (1) breach ofcontract
against CH2M and
Layne, (2) professional negligence against CH2M, (3) negligence against
CH2M and Layne, (4)
indemnity against CH2M should Layne prevail on its counterclaim
for standby time, and (5)
attorney’s fees against both Defendants.*4

CH2Mfiled a responsive pleading that included a counterclaim against
GEFA for breach
of contract seeking to recover monies owed under the Design Contra
ct and attorney’s fees.
“° GEFA SUMF §[ 29; CH2M Resp. 29: GEFA MPSJ against CH2M, Ex. R.
“! GEFA SUMF { 30; CH2M Resp. $30: GEFA MPSJ against CH2M, Ex. S.
® Id.

“8 GEFA Resp. to CH2M’s MSJ, p. 12-13; Ex. 13, p. 9 (Expert opines,
“GEFA acted prudently in not accepting the
[well] because of the damaged and collapsed casing” which compromi
sed its use as a municipal water source.)
“| GEFAalso broughtclaims against the two insurance companies
that jointly supplied a performance bondfor the
project on behalf of Layne. (Am. Compl., Count IIL.)

Laynefiled its responsive pleading whichincluded: (1) counterclaim
s against GEFA for
breach of contract, breach of the Prompt Pay Act (O.C.G.A. § 13-114), and breachofthe implied
warranty of suitability of design plans and specifications, (2)
cross claims against CH2M for
implied indemnity and negligent misrepresentation*> should GEFA
prevail onits claims against
Layne, and (3) claims to recover its litigation expenses and prejud
gmentinterest against both

GEFA and CH2M.
Certain damage claimsarepertinent to these motions. GEFA seekst
o recover the costs to
design and construct a new well whichit has valued based on the
costs it paid Layne and CH2M
fortheir design and construction work on the current well.46 Laynec
laims amounts owingonits

last pay applications whichincludes standby time and retainage held by GEFA.‘7
Il. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In Fulton County v. Ward-Poag, 310 Ga. 289, 292 (2020), the
Georgia Supreme Court
recently reiterated the “well-established principles” guiding trial
court’s review ofa motion for
summary judgment. “A trial court can grant summary judgmentto
a moving party onlyif there
are no genuine issues of material fact and the undisputed evidence
warrants judgmentas a matter
of law. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c). In reviewing the evidence, a court
must construeall facts and
drawall inferencesin favor of the non-movant.” Ward-Poagexpressl
y relied on Messex v. Lynch,
255 Ga. 208, 210 (1985) whichfurther provides, “[t]he party opposi
ng the motionis to be given
the benefit of all reasonable doubts in determining whether a genuin
e issue exists, and the trial

45 Inits pleadings, Layne styled this cross claim as negligent
misrepresentation/professional negligence. However,
after CH2M argued Layne lacked the privity required to assert a
professional negligence claim, Layne appears to have
abandoned that aspectof the claim, only offering argument as
to why its negligent misrepresentation cross claim
against CH2M should proceed. (CH2M Brf. in Supp. of MSJ against
Layne, p. 9; Layne Resp. in Opp. to CH2M MSJ,
Section B.)

“© CH2M SUMF 4 54; GEFAResp. to CH2M SUMF, 4 54.
‘7 Layne Ans. / Countercls. and Cross-Cls., §§ 47-49.

court must give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may be drawn
from the
evidence.”
Further, whencross-motions for summary judgment arefiled, “each party must show that
there is no genuineissue of material fact regarding the resolution ofthe essential points
of inquiry
and that each, respectively, is entitled to summary judgment;eitherparty, to prevail
by summary
judgment, mustbear its burdenof proof.” Plantation Pipe Line Co. v. Stonewall Ins.
Co., 335 Ga.
App. 302 (2015)(citation and punctuation omitted).

IV. ANALYSIS
A. GEFA’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against CH2M.
GEFA seeks partial summary judgment onits claim that CH2M breached the Design
Contract and a judgment that CH2M must indemnify GEFA as to Layne’s standby claim.
GEFA
does not seek summary judgment onits professional or ordinary negligence claims against
CH2M,
presumably recognizing these claimsraise disputed issuesoffact.
1.

GEFA’s BreachofContract Claim against CH2M.

GEFA’s breach of contract claim is based on CH2M’s: (1) failure to comply with
the
Design Contract’s provisionsto notify or obtain GEFA’s approval for design changest
o the screen
assembly and (2) failure to guard against non-conforming work when supervising
the well’s
construction. The three essential elements for a breach of contract claim are “(1) breach
and the
(2) resultant damages (3) to the party who has the right to complain about the contract
being
broken.” SAWSat Seven Hills, LLC, v. Forestar Realty, Inc., 342 Ga. App.
780, 784 (2017).

The Court finds questions offact as to the first two elements preclude summary judgmen
t onthis
claim.

10

Considering the evidencein the light most favorable to CH2M, a jury could conclude the
parties envisioned that changesin the screen assembly would be addressedin a final change order
at the project’s conclusion. Kevin Clark, GEFA’s designated representative,testified:
Q.

So... as to the well screen assembly, you expected to havea final change
order that would be preparedat the conclusionofthe project, correct? . . .

A.

Yes. 8

AsClark further testified, in the latter stages of the project, GEFA was aware that the screen
assembly had been designedand installed and never inquired aboutthefinal design changes thus
allowing the inference that they were expecting these changes to be addressedin final change
order.

Q.

And you understandatthis pointin July of 2016 the screen had already been
installed?

A.

Yes.

Q.

So youanticipated that Layne would do that work, and then on the back

end, or after the fact there would be final change order,correct? .. .

A.

Correct.*?

A jury could determinethis course of dealing explains CH2M’s failure to seek a change
order regardingits design and whyit allowed Layneto perform the alleged work GEFA now claims
is non-conforming. See generally Lloyd’s Syndicate No. 5820 v. AGCO Corp., 294 Ga. 805, 812

(2014) citing Scruggs v. Purvis, 218 Ga. 40, 42 (1962) (“The construction placed upona contract
by the parties thereto, as shownbytheir acts and conduct,is entitled to much weight and may be
conclusive uponthem”); Banks v. Echols, 302 Ga. App. 772, 776 (2010) citing Southern Life Ins.

‘8 Layne’s Resp. to CH2M-Layne SUMF,Ex. | (Clark Dep., p. 46 (objection omitted)).
* Id. GEFAsought toclarify this testimony with a subsequentaffidavit from Clark wherein he acknowledges changes
to the screen assembly wereto be addressedina final, post-construction changeorder; however, he avers such changes
werelimited to a cost reconciliation concerning the materials actually used, not design changes. (Clark Aff., J 10.)
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Co. of Ga v. Citizens Bank of Nashville, 91 Ga. App. 534, 538 (1955)(“[W]here, by a course of
conduct, one leads anotherto believe that he will not insist upon the strict termsof the contract,
he

will not be heard to complain because the other contracting party relies upon his acquiescence.”)
Considering the damages element of GEFA’s contract claim, evenif a jury determines
CH2Mbreached the Design Contractin failing to obtain a changeordersforthe re-design of the
screen assembly and allowing Layne to perform work that did not conformto the original design,
that failure did not necessarily lead to the collapse/deformation. Indeed, CH2M has argued, the
cause of the collapse/deformationis “hotly contested” with experts offering differing opinions as
to whether CH2M or Layne wasatfault.*°

Thus, a jury will need to considerthe question of

causationin orderto resolve GEFA’s breachof contractclaim.
2.

GEFA’s Indemnification Claim against CH2M for Layne’s Standby
Claim.

Pursuant to § 1.1.1.5.1 of the Design Contract, if completion of the project is delayed due
to CH2M’s negligenceorbreach ofthe Design Contract, it “shall indemnify [GEFA] againstall
reasonable costs, expenses, liabilities or damages resulting from such delay.” To the extent that
GEFAmay beliable to Layneonits standbyclaim,it seeks indemnification from CH2M.
At present, no award of Layne’s standby time has been made against GEFA, andthere has
been no findingthat the delay which prompted the standby claim was due to CH2M’s negligence
or contract breach. Accordingly, the Court finds GEFA’s request for summary judgmenton its
indemnification claim against CH2Mto be premature.
B. CH2M’s Motion for Summary Judgment against GEFA.

°° CH2M Resp. in Opp. to GEFA’s MPSJ, p. 20. Experts for CH2M and Layne have reached differing conclusions
regarding the cause of deformation/collapse. CH2M’s expert concluded the problem was“mostlikely” caused
when
the casing “ovalized” or becameout of round asa result of Layne’s installation and/or gravel packing. (Id.
at Ex. Y,
p. 3.) Layne’s expert determined CH2M negligently “failed to recognize potential casing collapse conditions
by
specifying too thin a casing wall” based on the depthofthe application. (Id. at Ex. Z, p. 6.)
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1.

Causation.

First, CH2M arguesall of GEFA’s claimsfail because GEFA cannotestablish that CH2M
caused any damages. Whethera plaintiff is claiming breachof contract, professional negligence,
orordinary negligence, it must prove the defendant’s breach caused damagetothe plaintiff. See
SAWS (damagescaused bybreach areessential elementof a claim for breach of contract); Pattman
Mann, 307 Ga. App. 413, 417 (2010) (causal connection between defendant’s conduct and
plaintiff's injury is essential element ofa claim forordinary or professional negligence). CH2M
argues, “GEFA must do more than pointout that the [collapse/deformation] was notpart of the
plan. It must also show that havingthe casing free of the [collapse/deformation] was material to
its contractual expectations with CH2M and caused GEFAactual injury.”>! Specifically, CH2M
contends the purposeof the well wasto explore the possibility of using the Cretaceous Acquifer
as a viable source ofdrinking water for coastal Georgia; andit contendsthat undisputed evidence
indicates CH2M and Laynecould havefinished the well and conducted the testing necessary for

this purpose.°?
GEFA respondsthat this argument ignores the project’s own Technical Specifications,
which CH2M prepared. They speak to GEFA’s expectations regarding the casing. Specifically,
§§ 33 21 13.06 (3.04(B)) and 33 21 13.03 (3.04(A)) provide the casing should be removed and
repaired “if it fails, collapses or separates during construction” andthat “if the casingorscreenis
brokenor collapses, then the well will not be considered satisfactory.” Thus, the Court finds a
Jury could determine that GEFA was damaged byreceiving a well with defective casing.
Further, CH2M argues the project was only intended to create a test well while GEFA

respondsthe project wasalso intended to create a production well that could serve as a municipal
>! CH2M Brf. in Supp. of MSJ against GEFA, p. II.

>? CH2M SUMF, {ff 28-30.
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water source. Neither of those terms appearto have a uniformly accepted definition. Evenifthis
terminology were somehow determinative, the Contract Documents use both of these termsto

describe the well. As the party moving for summary judgment, CH2Mitself has referred to the
project as a “production well” in the Technical Specifications and Bidding Documents it

prepared.°3
Accordingly, the Court finds disputed questions of fact as to whether the well, as
constructed, failed to meetits intended purposeresulting in damages to GEFA.
Finally,

CH2M

asserts

the

damages

GEFA

may

have

incurred

due

to

the

collapse/deformation are impermissibly speculative “because it was unknown whether the
Cretaceous Aquifer was a viable water source.”*4 Again, considering the evidencein thelight
most favorable to GEFA, the Technical Specifications reflect that a well with casing free from
defect was GEFA’s desired end result and a jury could determine GEFA was damaged becauseit
did not receive the object of its bargain. Also, there is evidence in the record, including the
successful deep water well in nearby Hilton Head, suggesting the viability of this deep aquifer as
a water source was not impermissibly speculative.
2.

ProofofDamages

CH2Malso claims GEFAhasoffered no proofofits damages. It cites John Thurmond &
Assoc., Inc. v. Kennedy, 284 Ga. 469 (2008) as establishing the proper measure of GEFA’s
damages.

Thurmond holds, “under Georgia law, cost of repair and diminution in value are

alternative, although oftentimes interchangeable measures of damagesin negligent construction
and breachof contract cases.” Id. at 471. CH2M argues GEFAhasfailed to offer evidence under
either measure. Although CH2M implies these are the only measure of damages in a construction
* Technical Specifications, § 01 11 00 1.01(A) and (B); Bidding Documents, title page.

*4 CH2M Brf. in Supp. of MSJ against GEFA,p. 13.
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defects dispute, Thurmondis notso limiting. As the Georgia Supreme Court expressly noted in
Thurmond,

[w]e begin our analysis of the proper measure of damages. . . by acknowledging that
damagesare intendedto place the injured party, as nearly as possible,in the same position
they would have beenifthe injury had neveroccurred. Juries, therefore, are given wide
latitude in determining the amountof damagesto be awarded based on the unique facts of
eachcase.
Id. at 469 (Citations omitted).

Thurmondrejected a defendant’s strict reading of precedent in a

manner that “create[d] an immutable rule” capping the amount of damages a plaintiff might
recover. Id. at 473. “To construe this language so as to mechanically limit damages would be
contrary to the charge that the methodofcalculating damages should beflexibleso as to reasonably
compensate the injured party, and at the same time, be fairto all parties.”

Id.

Essentially,

Thurmond recognizes that claims for construction defects arise in a variety of circumstances and
the law of damages mustprovidea certain amountoflatitude to address a givensituation.
Here, considering the evidencein the light most favorable to GEFA, repair of the well is
not viable and the well, in its current state, is of no value to GEFA. Moreover,a jury could also

find there is no way to accurately determine the diminished value of such a singular project.
Accordingly, based on this uniquesituation, a jury could determine that awarding GEFAthe cost
of a new well is the most appropriate way to place GEFA “in the same position” it would have
occupied butforits injury, particularly considering the provisions in the Contract Documentsthat
contemplate GEFA should receive a well free from casing defects.
CH2M circles back to its argument regarding the well’s purpose — as a project to test the
viability of the Cretaceous Acquifer — to argue that “GEFA’s demandto replace a well that would
have served the intended purpose of the project constitutes economic waste.’”=5 See generally

°° CH2M Brf. in Supp. of MSJ against GEFA, p. 15.
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Granite Const. Co. v. United States, 962 F.2d 998, 1007 (Fed. Cir. 1992)(“There is ample authority
for holding that the government should not be permitted to direct the replacement of work in
situations wherethecostof correction is economically wasteful and the workis otherwise adequate
for its intended purpose.”)

However, as established above, the record offers contradictory

evidence on the well’s intended purpose, so the economic waste argumentis not susceptible to
summary judgment.
3. Indemnification
Laynefiled a counterclaim against GEFA to recoverstandby time under the Contract.
Should Layne obtain such an award, GEFA seeks indemnification from CH2M under § 1.1.1.5 of
the Design Contract, contending any standby time award would result from CH2M’s negligence
and/or breach of contract.

CH2M seeks summary judgment on this indemnification claim,

contending that the standby claim fails as a matter of law because Layne is not contractually
entitled to standby compensation. CH2M likens Layne’s standby claim to a liquidated damages
provision and argues that standby time was indisputably unmerited under the Construction
Contract’s terms.

Notably, GEFA, the party whodirectly contracted to pay Layne standby

compensation and who, therefore, would beprimarily responsible for Layne’s standby claim, has
not lodged these attacks on Layne’s standby claim. The Court cannotfind that the claimfails as a
matter oflaw.
4.

Attorney's Fees and PrejudgmentInterest

Because they are derivative, the Court finds GEFA’s claims for attorney’s fees and
prejudgmentinterest should be decided bythe jury along with GEFA’s substantive claims. See ZSpace, Inc. v. Dantanna’s CNN Ctr., LLC, 349 Ga. App. 248, 259 (2019)(claims for attorney’s

fees and interest are derivative in nature),
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CH2Malso sought summary judgmenton the merits of GEFA’s claim for attorney’s fees
under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11, arguing that GEFA is unable to demonstrate any of the underlying
conditionsofthe statute to justify such an award. O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 permitsa plaintiff who has
specially pled to recover his fees “where the defendanthas acted in bad faith... .” This bad faith
“mustrelate to the acts in the transactionitself prior to the litigation, not to the conduct during or
motive with which a party proceedsin litigation.”

Fresh Floors, Inc. v. Forrest Cambridge

Apartments, L.L.C., 257 Ga. App. 270, 271 (2002). “On summary judgment, evenslight evidence
of bad faith can be enoughto create an issue for the jury.” Nash v. Reed, 349 Ga. App. 381, 383
(2019)(Citation and punctuation omitted).
Here, CH2M ignored repeated concerns about the “collapse strength” of its screen
assembly design and pursued whata jury could find was a risky design choice without informing
GEFA. Further, CH2M was aware, under the Technical Specifications that it prepared, Layne

alone was charged with addressing defects in the casing. After the deformation/collapse was
discovered, CH2M internally referenced the “beauty” of this contract requirement as it made
Laynealone responsible for addressing issues“if the casing is collapsed.”°° Consequently, a jury
could also determine that CH2M took unnecessaryrisks in designing the screen assembly based
onthe notionit could avoid accountability for any resulting problems.

Accordingly, the record

containsthe “slight evidence” ofbad faith sufficient to submit this claim to a jury. Id.
C.

_GEFA’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgmentagainst Layne.

GEFA seeks summary judgment onits breach of contract claim against Layne as well as
Layne’s counterclaims for monies owed under the Construction Contract, violations ofthe Prompt

°° GEFA’s Brf. in Opp. to CH2M MSI, Ex. 6.
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Pay Act, and breach of the implied warranty of suitable design. GEFA does not seek summary
judgmentonits negligence claims against Layne.
GEFAfirst claims Layne breached the Construction Contract byfailing to repair or replace
the collapsed/deformed casing or build a new well which implicates the Spearin doctrine. This
doctrine wasfirst established in United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132 (1918), and later recognized
by the Georgia Supreme Court in Decatur County v. Prayton, Howton & Wood Contracting Co.,
165 Ga. 742 (1928).

It provides, “[i]f a contractor is bound to build according to plans and

specifications prepared by the owner, the contractorwill not be responsible for the consequences
of defects in plans and specifications.” Id. at 760. Layne argues, “[a]t its core, Spearin is based
in equity — a recognition that contractors do not indemnify ownersortheir engineers for negligent
designs.”*’ In support of its argument that Spearin controls, Layne notes GEFA’s designated
representative testified that the only defect in Layne’s work wasits installation ofthe thinnerliner

according to CH2M’s revised design.*8
While Layneasserts this situation constitutesa “textbook Spearin fact pattern,” a jury could
determine that Laynefailed to adhereto the plans andspecifications for the well as outlined in the
Contract Documents and, thus, the doctrine does not apply.°? Further, while Georgia law on the
Spearin doctrineis scant, otherjurisdictions have recognized an equitable exceptionto the doctrine
where a contractor knowsor should have knownofa defectin the specifications. For example, in
Housing Auth. of City of Texarkana v. E.W. Johnson Constr. Co., 573 §.W.2d 316, 322 (Ark.

1978), the Supreme Court of Arkansas recognized Spearin; however, it also found “a competent
and experienced contractor cannotrely upon submitted specifications and plans whereheisfully

*7 Layne Resp. in Opp. to GEFA MSJ, p. 14.
°8 Layne Resp. to GEFA-Layne SUMF,Ex. 4 (Clark Dep., p. 58.)
» Layne’s Resp. in Opp. to GEFA’s MPSJ, p. 15.
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aware, or should have been aware,that the plans and specifications cannot produce the proposed
results.” Here, based upon its communications with CH2M raising concernsaboutthe design of
the screen assembly, a jury could find that Layne knew thethinner casing would or waslikely to
fail. Accordingly, a jury will need to determine whether the Spearin doctrine applies in this case.
Therefore, GEFA is not entitled to summary judgmentonthis particular breach of contract claim
or on Layne’s counterclaim for breachof the implied warranty of suitability of design plans and

specifications whichis based onSpearin.
GEFAalsoasserts Layne breached the Construction Contract, by failing to obtain a signed
change order before performing non-conforming work,failing to notify GEFA that CH2M sought
to change the Contract Documents, andfailing to notify GEFA thatit disagreed with CH2M’s
decision to change the thickness of the blank casing. Like the breach ofcontract claim GEFA
asserted against CH2M,a jury will need to assess the conflicting evidenceas to the parties’ intent
concerning the scopeofthe final, post-construction change order and also whether any breach of
these particular contract terms caused GEFA damages. These same questions of fact also bar
summary judgment on Layne’s counterclaims for monies owed under the Construction Contract
and for violations of the Prompt Pay Act.
D.

CH2M’s Motion for Summary Judgmentagainst Layne’s Cross-Claims.

CH2M seeks summary judgment on all of Layne’s cross claims including: (1) implied
indemnity should GEFAprevail onits claims against Layne, (2) negligent misrepresentation, and
(3) attorney’s fees.

di:

Implied Indemnity

CH2M argues Layne’s cross claim for implied indemnity is barred by Georgia’s
apportionmentstatute, O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b) provides:
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[w]here an action is brought against more than one personfor injury to person orproperty,
the trier of fact, in its determination ofthe total amount of damages to be awarded,if any,
shall after a reduction of damages pursuant to subsection (a) of this Codesection,if any,
apportion its award of damages among the persons whoare liable according to the
percentage of fault of each person. Damages apportionedbythetrier of fact as provided in
this Code section shall be the liability of each person against whom they are awarded,shall
not be a joint liability amongthe personsliable, and shall not be subject to any right of
contribution.
With the enactmentof the apportionmentstatute, the only category of commonlaw indemnitythat
remains is vicarious liability where one “is compelled to pay damages because of negligence
imputed to him asthe result of a tort committed by another”suchasarises between a principal and
his agent. District Owners Ass’n, Inv. v. AMEC Environmental & Infrastructure, Inc., 322 Ga.
App. 713, 715-716 (2013).

Because no relationship exists whereby Layne could be held

vicariously liable to GEFA for CH2M’s actions, CH2M,contends a jury will have to apportion
fault, and, consequently, Layne’s cross claim for implied indemnity fails.
Layneresponds thatthe statute only applies in the context ofjoint tortfeasors. Id. at 716.
Thus, it recognizes to the extent GEFA hasasserted a negligence claim against both Defendants,
the apportionment statute would apply. Yet, it argues to the extent GEFA alleges Layneis in
breach of its contractual obligation to re-place the well, irrespective of the cause for the
collapse/deformation, the apportionmentstatute would not apply. For example, should a jury find
CH2M’s negligencewasthe sole causeofthe collapse/deformationand apportion no fault to Layne
butstill require Layne to replace the well underthe Construction Contract, Layneclaims it would
still have a right to seek indemnity from CH2M.
The Court agrees with Layne. Until a jury resolves the questionsabouttheliability of these
two Defendants, the Court cannotdetermine, as a matter of law, Layne’s implied indemnity claim
is without merit.
2.

Negligent Misrepresentation
20

Layne asserts CH2M negligently misrepresented “that the thinner casing was a sound

engineering choice and that it would not be susceptible to collapse or deformation during

installation” upon which Laynerelied to its detriment.® Layne identifies two waysit could be
damaged by this alleged misrepresentation. First, Layne claims that should a jury return a verdict
against it in favor of GEFA, Layne will have beeninjuredto the extent that liability was caused
by CH2M’s negligence.®' Second, Layne contends “in the event that GEFA prevails... and
Layneforfeits or otherwise loses the benefit of the unpaid pay [applications] including amounts
due, CH2M is liable to Layne for those amountsasa resultofits negligent misrepresentations.”
Again, CH2M arguesthis claimis barred by Georgia’s apportionmentstatute, and, again,
the Court finds a jury will need to make certain decisions regarding the contract andtortliability
of these two Defendants beforeit is known whetherthe apportionmentstatute would bar Layne’s
negligent misrepresentation claim as a matter of law.
In further support of its motion, CH2M argues Layne’s negligent misrepresentation cross
claim fails because Layne cannot demonstrate that it reasonably relied on the alleged

misrepresentationor that it was damaged as a result. Reasonable reliance and resulting damages
are both essential elements of a negligent misrepresentation claim. J.E. Black Const. Co.. Inc. v.
Fergueson Ent., Inc., 284 Ga. App. 345, 348 (2007) (Citation and punctuation omitted).
CH2MarguesLaynecould not have reasonably relied on CH2M’s misrepresentation about
the suitability of the thinner casing because it knew the thinner casing was not an appropriate
design choice. Onlyin clear circumstances is reasonablereliance to be determined by the Court
and not a jury. Edel _v. Southtowne Motors of NewnanII, Inc., 338 Ga. App. 376, 380 (2016)

°° Layne Ans, / Countercls., and Cross-cls., {{ 80-81.

51 Id. at 485.
2 Id. at | 86.
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(addressing reasonable reliance requirement in context of common law fraud claim).

Here,it is

far from clear whether Layne,the project’s contractor, could or could not reasonably rely on the
design choices made bythe project’s designated engineer, CH2M.
As to damages, CH2M makes a multi-pronged attack on the standby portion of Layne’s
damages which the Court addressed andrejected in relation to CH2M’s motion against GEFA,
above.

However, Laynealso seeksto recoverthe contract retainage GEFAhas withheld, so even

if Layne was notcontractually entitled to compensation forits standby time, there could be other
damages to Layne arising from this negligent misrepresentation claim that a jury mayconsider.
3.

Attorney’s Fees

Layne’s claims for attorney’s fees and prejudgmentinterest presentjury questions based
uponthe samelaw andanalysis the Court used addressing CH2M’s motion against GEFA,above.

V. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered and adjudged thatall pending motions for
summary judgment are DENIED.

So ordered this 5" day of January, 2022.
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